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INTRODUCTION 
“His life will never be the one that he dreamed about and worked so 
hard to achieve. . . . That is a steep price to pay for 20 minutes of action 




out of his 20 plus years of life.”1 So Dan Turner argued as to why his son, 
Brock Turner, should receive probation instead of jail time for a brutal 
sexual assault that left the victim hospitalized in January 2016.2 Dan 
Turner’s letter caused significant outrage at the “lack of self-awareness” 
and “tone-deafness” expressed throughout his plea.3 But the plea worked.4 
Brock Turner received only six months in jail and three years of probation5 
after a judge worried a stiffer sentence would have a “severe impact” on 
him.6 
Just a year after his release, Brock Turner is already a textbook case 
of how the criminal justice system fails sexual assault victims.7 In the 
second edition of Callie Marie Richardson’s Introduction to Criminal 
Justice, a photo of Turner appears next to the definition of rape with a 
caption that reads: 
Brock Turner, a Stanford student who raped and assaulted an 
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2018, by JOURDAN E. MOSCHITTA CURET. 
 1. Michael E. Miller, ‘A steep price to pay for 20 minutes of action’: Dad 
defends Stanford sex offender, WASH. POST (June 6, 2016), https://www.washington 
post.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2016/06/06/a-steep-price-to-pay-for-20-minutes-of  
-action-dad-defends-stanford-sex-offender/?utm_term=.ff8f238296fc [https://perma 
.cc/XYF3-B6GX] (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 2. Id. 
 3. See, e.g., id.; Emma Gray, This Letter From The Stanford Sex Offender’s Dad 
Epitomizes Rape Culture, HUFFINGTON POST (June 6, 2016, 1:07 PM), https://www 
.huffingtonpost.com/entry/brock-turner-dad-letter-is-rape-culture-in-a-nutshell_us_5 
7555bace4b0ed593f14cb30 [https://perma.cc/3D5T-GUHD]; Suzannah Weiss, 
Brock Turner’s Dad’s Statement Is Exactly What Rape Culture Looks Like, BUSTLE 
(June 6, 2016), https://www.bustle.com/articles/165050-brock-turners-dads-state 
ment-is-exactly-what-rape-culture-looks-like [https://perma.cc/H2GV-E7HG]; 
Rachel Paula Abrahamson, Outraged Dad Responds to Stanford Rapist’s Father in 
Powerful Open Letter: ‘Brock Is Not the Victim Here’, US WEEKLY (June 9, 2016), 
https://www.usmagazine.com/celebrity-news/news/outraged-dad-responds-to-stan 
ford-rapists-father-in-powerful-letter-w209565/ [https://perma.cc/55XP-DX PT].  
 4. Miller, supra note 1. 
 5. The jury convicted Turner on three counts: (1) assault with intent to 
commit rape of an intoxicated or unconscious person; (2) sexual penetration when 
the victim was intoxicated; and (3) sexual penetration where the victim was 
unconscious of the nature of the act. See People v. Turner, No. B1577162, 2016 
WL 3442307 (Cal. Super. May 30, 2016). 
 6. Miller, supra note 1. 
 7. Kris Seavers, Brock Turner is ‘the definition of rape’ in this criminal 
justice textbook, DAILY DOT (Sept. 12, 11:14 AM), https://www.dailydot.com/irl 
/brock-turner-already-textbook-case-criminal-justice-system-fails-rape-survivors/  
[https://perma.cc/8NTS-P8NZ]. 




unconscious female college student behind a dumpster at a 
fraternity party, was recently released from jail after serving only 
three months. Some are shocked at how short this sentence is. 
Others who are more familiar with the way sexual violence has 
been handled in the criminal justice system are shocked that he 
was found guilty and served any time at all.8 
In addition to addressing public outrage over the short prison sentence, 
Turner’s inclusion in the textbook asserts that Brock Turner is the 
definition of rape; in other words, Brock Turner’s brutal sexual violence 
is the standard definition of rape offenses.9 One of the major issues with 
narrowly defining rape as brutal sexual violence is the definition’s eclipse 
of the wider category of nonviolent sexual assault. Although the Turner 
case represents a horrific miscarriage of justice, it nonetheless confronts 
society with important questions: what qualifies as sexual assault? How 
should the law develop to create a modern regime governing one of the 
most sickening and painful forms of violence?10 
In Louisiana, the law governing third-degree rape does not lessen the 
disparity between brutal sexual violence and nonviolent sexual assault.11 
Louisiana Revised Statutes § 14:43 defines third-degree rape as sex 
without the victim’s consent.12 The statute does not define consent or 
provide adequate guidance for individuals contemplating sexual conduct 
to be sure of compliance with the statute, or for law enforcement charged 
with investigating guilt or innocence to clearly determine probable cause.13 
Inevitably, many third-degree rape cases go before a factfinder who must 
                                                                                                             
 8. Id. Rennison explained that her textbook attempted to change the dialogue 
about victims of crime as well as its perpetrators within the criminal justice 
community. See John Merritt, Callie Rennison Receives National Victimology 
Award, VIEWS FROM WEST: CU DENVER SCH. PUB. AFF. (Nov. 15, 2016), 
https://spaviews.ucdenver.edu/2016/11/15/callie-rennison-receives-national-victim 
ology-award/ [https://perma.cc/2SPR-4BZ3] (“Existing criminal justice books have 
focused on three elements: cops, courts, and corrections. They speak little about 
victims, reflecting how they have effectively been in the shadows of our criminal 
justice system.”). 
 9. Seavers, supra note 7. 
 10. Miller, supra note 1. 
 11. See LA. REV. STAT. § 14:43 (2018). 
 12. Id. (“Third-degree rape is rape committed when the anal, oral, or vagina 
sexual intercourse is deemed to be without the lawful consent of a victim because 
it is committed under any one or more of the following circumstances . . . [w]hen 
the offender acts without the consent of the victim.”). 
 13. Id. 




determine whether the parties consented.14 In third-degree rape cases, the 
factfinder attempts to determine whether consent was given by adopting a 
“totality of the circumstances” approach and deciding if the circumstances 
of the alleged crime lead to the “reasonable” inference that consent was 
present beyond a reasonable doubt.15 Because of mass confusion about the 
meaning of consent16 and inherent jury bias stemming from an exposure 
to rape culture,17 the formation of a personal standard for every factfinder 
results in inequitable and inconsistent results throughout Louisiana 
courtrooms.18 
The solution to the ambiguity of the meaning of consent in Louisiana 
Revised Statutes § 14:43 is to adopt a legislative “affirmative consent” 
standard.19 When third-degree rape cases are brought to trial and consent 
is ambiguous, the factfinder should apply the affirmative consent standard 
in light of the “reasonableness” principle established by State in the 
Interest of M.T.S.: a leading case in rape law reform.20  
Part I of this Comment discusses the recent shift in rape law from a 
narrow definition—that only a forcible component satisfies—to a more 
expansive affirmative permission scheme. Part I also addresses the 
development of Louisiana’s current third-degree rape regime and 
introduces the expansion of the “consent clause.” Part II analyzes the 
ambiguity in Louisiana’s third-degree rape law and examines how consent 
is defined in Louisiana’s courtrooms. Part III highlights the need for a clear 
definition of “consent” by addressing the prominence of sexual assault in 
modern culture and on Louisiana college campuses. Part IV proposes a 
                                                                                                             
 14. Interview with Angel Monistere, Assistant District Attorney, 21st 
Judicial District Attorney’s Office, in Amite, La. (Sept. 22, 2017). 
 15. Id. 
 16. Aya Gruber, Consent Confusion, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 415, 417 (2016) 
(providing that there are a variety of views on what equals consent, ranging from 
mental willingness to an enthusiastic “yes”).  
 17. Meagen M. Hildebrand & Cynthia J. Najdowski, The Potential Impact of 
Rape Culture on Juror Decision Making: Implications for Wrongful Acquittals in 
Sexual Assault Trials, 78 ALB. L. REV. 1059, 1061 (2015) (providing that rape 
culture negatively impacts juror decision making in sexual assault trials by not 
only increasing the likelihood that jurors will endorse erroneous beliefs about rape 
and sexually objectify women, but also by non-consciously influencing the types 
of evidence jurors attend to and the extent to which they blame the parties 
involved).  
 18. Interview with Angel Monistere, supra note 14. 
 19. “Affirmative consent” requires an affirmative and voluntary agreement 
to engage in sexual activity from a fully capacitated conscious person. See infra 
Part IV.A. 
 20. See generally State in the Interest of M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266 (N.J. 1992). 




clear legislative standard for affirmative consent in Louisiana that 
responds to the needs of the criminal justice system. Part IV also responds 
to common criticisms of the affirmative consent movement and raises the 
possibility of unconstitutional vagueness in Louisiana Revised Statutes § 
14:43’s “consent clause.” Part V proposes a method for resolving 
circumstantial ambiguity that may remain even with the adoption of an 
affirmative consent standard—the canon of judicial interpretation of 
“reasonableness.” This Comment concludes by illustrating three aims the 
“affirmative consent” standard achieves: (1) providing adequate notice as 
to what constitutes sexual assault; (2) providing guidance to law 
enforcement charged with determining whether probable cause for 
culpability to the commission of sexual assault exists; and (3) providing 
justice to victims of sexual assault and individuals falsely accused of 
sexual assault.  
I. THE CHANGE THAT HINDERED, RATHER THAN HELPED 
Traditionally, what rape scholar Susan Estrich described as “boys’ 
rules” defined American rape laws.21 Although legislatures have not 
eradicated the inevitable gender-based inequities in the law that grew from 
“boys’ rules” everywhere, rape law has undergone significant reform in 
the past few decades, leading to a more modern—and less biased—
approach.22 
A. From Tradition to Modernity: Rape Law Through Time 
Until recent years, state laws often stacked the law against women who 
asserted they had been raped.23 Blackstone, one of the preeminent legal 
authories, defined rape as “carnal knowledge of a woman forcibly and 
against her will.”24 Thus, sexual intercourse without the consent of the 
                                                                                                             
 21. Susan Estrich, REAL RAPE 60 (1987). One need not agree with the view 
that rape law was devised for the misogynistic purpose of “embodying and 
ensuring male control over women’s sexuality” to agree with the assertion that 
the common law approach to rape was male-centered. Joshua Dressler, Where We 
Have Been, And Where We Might Be Going: Some Cautionary Reflections On 
Rape Law Reform, 46 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 409, 410 (1998). After all, the law of 
rape developed during a time when women played no role in legal affairs, even as 
to offenses that affected them intimately. Id. 
 22. Dressler, supra note 21.  
 23. Id. at 415.  
 24. Id. at 416. 




victim did not constitute rape unless the intercourse was forcible.25 The 
force requirement led to an “odd and dangerous principle”—the resistance 
requirement.26 A woman had to physically resist her attacker, often “to the 
utmost”; otherwise, a rape conviction would fail.27 The resistance 
requirement enhanced the possibility that the male aggressor would 
escalate his violence to overcome the victim’s resistance and, in the 
process, aggravate the victim’s physical injuries.28 Thus, the traditional 
definition of rape was exceedingly narrow, and the resistance requirement 
heightened the risk of serious harm to the victim.29 
In many jurisdictions, substantive rape law has evolved from 
Blackstone’s definition.30 While some of the changes are positive, some 
ambiguous developments are troubling.31 The primary change in forcible 
rape law pertains to the resistance required to overcome the requisite 
force.32 Some states abolished the resistance requirement completely.33 
Other states no longer require the woman to resist “to the utmost,” and 
instead only demand that resistance be reasonable under the 
circumstances.34 Perhaps the most significant change in judicial attitudes 
concerning forcible rape is the finding of rape in more ambiguous 
circumstances that extend beyond brutal sexual violence.35  
Some states are taking rape reform to an elevated level, eradicating the 
requirement of force through statutory construction or interpretation.36 In 
State in the Interest of M.T.S., the court convicted a defendant in New 
Jersey of forcible rape under a statute that required sexual penetration 
resulting from “physical force or coercion.”37 Although no party alleged 
coercion or violence regarding intercourse, the court found that the 
defendant had used enough physical force to engage in intercourse, 
thereby committing rape.38 What differentiates rape, then, from consensual 
                                                                                                             
 25. Id. at 417. 
 26. Id.  
 27. Id. 
 28. Id.  
 29. Id. at 418. 
 30. Id. at 418–19. 
 31. Id.  
 32. Id.  
 33. Id. at 419. 
 34. Id. Even where resistance is only required to be reasonable, a woman is 
still not required to resist if the male uses or threatens to use serious force. Id.  
 35. Id. at 419. See also State v. Rusk, 406 A.2d 624 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
1979), rev’d, 424 A.2d 720 (Md. 1981).  
 36. Dressler, supra note 21, at 421. 
 37. State in the Interest of M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1269 (N.J. 1992). 
 38. Id. at 1277. 




sex is just that—consent—or more so, “affirmative and freely-given 
permission . . . to the specific act of penetration.”39 Thus, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court birthed the “affirmative consent” standard that fueled the 
fire of rape law reform,40 and although slowly walking the reformative 
road, Louisiana sexual assault laws have stumbled behind states engaged 
in progressive reform.41 
B. The Expansion and Modernization of Louisiana Revised Statutes § 
14:43 Through the “Consent Clause” 
In 2015, the Louisiana Legislature standardized rape laws to mirror 
those of other state and federal rape statutes.42 Governor Bobby Jindal 
signed legislation into effect that changed the terminology associated with 
Louisiana’s rape statutes: “aggravated rape” became “first-degree rape”; 
“forcible rape” became “second-degree rape”; and “simple rape” became 
“third-degree rape.”43 
Louisiana Revised Statutes § 14:42 defines first-degree rape as sexual 
intercourse without the lawful consent of the victim only when certain 
conditions are met.44 The circumstances that vitiate consent include when 
the victim resists to the utmost but is overcome by force and when the 
offender is armed with a dangerous weapon.45 Louisiana Revised Statutes 
§ 14:42.1 defines second-degree rape in a similar fashion: intercourse 
                                                                                                             
 39. Dressler, supra note 21, at 421.  
 40. Id.  
 41. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 261–69 (West 2017); 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 3121–26 (West 2017); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-61 to 18.2-67.5 
(West 2017); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 130.25–130.70 (McKinney 2017); N.C. GEN. 
CODE ANN. §§ 14-27.20 to 14-27.27 (West 2017) (listing states engaged in more 
progressive rape reform law). 
 42. Emily Lane, ‘Nothing Simple About Rape’: Bill Changes Terminology in 
Louisiana’s Rape Laws, TIMES-PICAYUNE (June 1, 2015, 5:47 PM), http://www.no 
la.com/politics/index.ssf/2015/06/simple_rape_louisiana_law_term.html [https://per 
ma.cc/4F9G-GVPY]. 
 43. Id. 
 44. LA. REV. STAT. § 14:42(A) (2018). 
 45. Id. Circumstances under which consent to intercourse is not present 
include: (1) when the victim resists the act to the utmost but the resistance is 
overcome by force; (2) when the victim is prevented from resisting the act by 
threats of great and immediate bodily harm, accompanied by apparent power of 
execution; and (3) when the victim is prevented from resisting the act because the 
offender is armed with a dangerous weapon. Id. § 14:42(A)(1)–(3). 




without the lawful consent of the victim only when certain conditions—
less violent than those required for first-degree rape—are satisfied.46  
Prior to legislative reform, Louisiana’s third-degree rape statute47 
mirrored the pattern of defining sexual consent solely in the negative.48 
Pre-revision Louisiana Revised Statutes § 14:43 defined third-degree rape 
as intercourse without the consent of the victim when committed only 
under certain conditions listed in the statute.49 Consent was not present 
when the victim was incapable of resisting or unable to understand the 
nature of the act by reason of an abnormal condition of mind, and the 
offender knew or should have known of the victim’s incapacity.50 
Furthermore, consent was not present when a female victim submitted 
under the belief that the person committing the act was her husband, and 
the offender’s artifice, pretense, or concealment intentionally induced such 
belief.51 
In 2015, a legislative revision expanded the substance of Louisiana 
Revised Statutes § 14:43.52 The revision added a circumstance under 
which third-degree rape occurs that the legislature did not recognize until 
2010.53 In addition to the preexisting conditions that vitiate consent, third-
degree rape now occurs when sexual intercourse is committed without the 
lawful consent of the victim because it is committed “when the offender 
acts without the consent of the victim.”54 In other words, instead of being 
defined only by conditions that also must be present to vitiate consent, third-
degree rape is simply intercourse without consent.55 Although circular and 
initially confounding, this “consent clause” appears to act as an umbrella to 
                                                                                                             
 46. Id. § 14:42.1(A). Circumstances under which consent to intercourse is not 
present include: (1) when the victim is prevented from resisting the act by force 
or threats of physical violence under circumstances where the victim reasonably 
believes that such resistance would not prevent the rape; and (2) when the victim 
is incapable of resisting or of understanding the nature of the act by reason of 
stupor or abnormal condition of the mind produced by a narcotic or anesthetic 
agent or other controlled dangerous substance administered by the offender and 
without the knowledge of the victim. Id. § 14:42.1(A)(1)–(2). 
 47. Id. § 14:43(A) (2010). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. § 14:43(A)(1) (2010). 
 51. Id. § 14:43(A)(3). 
 52. Compare id. § 14:43 (2010), with id. § 14:43 (2015). 
 53. See id. 
 54. Id. § 14:43(A)(4) (2018). 
 55. Id. 




catch cases of nonconsensual sex that did not fit squarely within one of the 
preexisting circumstances expressly negating sexual consent.56  
Although the “consent clause” attempts to catch cases of rape that do 
not fit within the traditional framework established prior to the 2015 
legislative revision, the “consent clause” presents an incongruous 
problem.57 Despite the added requirement of unfettered consent, the simple 
nature of Louisiana Revised Statutes § 14:43’s “consent clause” creates 
significant ambiguity regarding how to determine consent—as the statute 
provides no definition, explanation, or standard—leading to significant 
inconsistencies in the law’s interpretation and application.58  
II. LOUISIANA’S LACK OF STANDARDIZED CONSENT FOR THIRD-DEGREE 
RAPE 
Contrary to multiple states that statutorily define sexual consent in a 
clear fashion,59 Louisiana lacks an explicit definition for sexual consent or 
how a court should determine it.60 In fact, no definition of “consent” exists 
anywhere in the Louisiana Criminal Code.61  
A. The Ambiguous Consent Clause and the Troubles It Brings 
Louisiana’s lack of a definition for sexual consent stands in stark 
contrast with other states.62 California defines consent as “positive 
cooperation in act or attitude pursuant to an exercise of free will. The 
person must act freely and voluntarily and have knowledge of the nature 
of the act or transaction involved.”63 Montana defines sexual consent as 
“words or overt actions indicating a freely given agreement to have sexual 
intercourse or sexual contact,” and other qualifiers further define but do 
                                                                                                             
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. § 14:43; see also Doe v. State, 623 So. 2d 72 (La. Ct. App. 1993); L.K. 
v. Reed, 631 So. 2d 604 (La. Ct. App. 1994); Penny v. State, 702 So. 2d 1173 (La. 
Ct. App. 1997). 
 59. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.6 (West 2017); MON. CODE ANN. § 
45-5-501 (West 2017); OKL. STAT. ANN. § 113 (West 2017); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 
940.225 (West 2017). 
 60. See LA. REV. STAT. § 14:43. 
 61. See generally LA. CRIM. CODE. 
 62. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.6; MON. CODE ANN. § 45-5-501; OKL. 
STAT. ANN. § 113; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.225. 
 63. CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.6. 




not limit it.64 Wisconsin defines sexual consent65 as “words or overt 
actions by a person who is competent to give informed consent indicating 
a freely given agreement to have sexual intercourse or sexual contact.”66 
Oklahoma also provides a brief statutory definition of sexual consent, in 
that consent requires “the affirmative, unambiguous and voluntary 
agreement to engage in a specific sexual activity during a sexual encounter 
which can be revoked at any time.”67 As opposed to Louisiana law, which 
provides no definition of consent, these laws provide standards to 
determine whether a sexual act is consensual.68 
In the absence of a statutory definition of sexual consent in Louisiana, 
civil jurisprudence sheds light on the meaning of the term.69 In Doe v. 
State,70 the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal identified one factor 
that vitiates consent.71 In Doe, a mother sued the State of Louisiana, an 
employee of a state school, and the employee’s insurers for damages 
arising out of the alleged molestation of a mentally handicapped adult 
                                                                                                             
 64. MON. CODE ANN. § 45-5-501. Other qualifiers defining consent include: 
(1) an expression of lack of consent through words or conduct means there is no 
consent or that consent has been withdrawn; (2) a current or previous dating or 
social or sexual relationship by itself or the manner of dress of the person involved 
with the accused in the conduct at issue does not constitute consent; and (3) lack 
of consent may be inferred based on all of the surrounding circumstances and 
must be considered in determining whether a person gave consent. Id. 
 65. 2017 Wisconsin Assembly Bill No. 425 proposed legislation to be 
considered during the 2017–2018 Regular Session modifying the definition of 
“consent” for sexual assault. 2017 Wisconsin Assembly Bill No. 425, Wisconsin 
One Hundred Third Legislature–2017–2018 Regular Session, 2017 WI A.B. 425 
(NS). Under the Bill, if an actor removes a sexually protective device, such as a 
condom before or during sexual intercourse or other sexual contact without his or 
her partner’s permission, there has been no valid consent to the sexual act. Id. The 
Bill ultimately failed. Id. 
 66. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.225.  
 67. OKL. STAT. ANN. § 113.  
 68. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.6; MON. CODE ANN. § 45-5-501; OKL. 
STAT. ANN. § 113; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.225. 
 69. See, e.g., Doe v. State, 623 So. 2d 72 (La. Ct. App. 1993); L.K. v. Reed, 
631 So. 2d 604 (La. Ct. App. 1994); Penny v. State, 702 So. 2d 1173 (La. Ct. App. 
1997). Because of the lack of reported rapes and the gray area in which the reported 
cases fall, most third-degree rape cases in which the issue is solely whether consent 
existed absent any other telling circumstances rarely rise through the criminal court 
docket on appeal. Interview with Angel Monistere, supra note 14. 
 70. See generally Doe v. State, Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 623 So. 2d 
72 (La. Ct. App. 1993). 
 71. Id. at 72. 




student.72 The court found that having a mental age of approximately 6–7 
years voided consensual capacity, even though the victim was 
approximately 29 years old at the time of the offense.73 One year later, 
Louisiana’s Third Circuit Court of Appeal rendered a similar verdict, 
upholding the absence of sexual consent in the civil action, L.K. v. Reed.74 
The trial court determined that a 13-year-old special education student 
consented to sexual intercourse with an 18-year-old special education 
student; however, her consent was meaningless given her legal status as a 
minor.75 The Third Circuit disagreed, ruling that age alone cannot fully 
invalidate consent to sexual intercourse; instead, the court rendered the 
child’s consent meaningless from a legal standpoint because of her family 
stress, age, intellect, and social skills.76 
Four years after Doe, in Penny v. State,77 the plaintiff alleged that while 
she was a prison inmate, a maintenance employee raped and impregnated 
her.78 Over the course of the proceedings, the parties stipulated that the 
employee “never physically or verbally threatened, coerced, forced, or 
intimidated [the plaintiff] into any sexual relationship.”79 Furthermore, the 
plaintiff was aware that the employee had no power to change any condition 
of her incarceration.80 The plaintiff argued that the circumstances of her 
imprisonment, the prison environment, and the attendant emotional and 
psychological stresses rendered her “consent” invalid.81 In defining consent, 
the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal turned to the definition in 
Black’s Law Dictionary: “[an] agreement, approval, or permission as to 
some act or purpose, esp[ecially] given voluntarily by a competent 
person.”82 The plaintiff contended that consent, from a legal standpoint, is 
mutable and variable.83 The court chose neither to confirm nor deny this 
argument.84 Though the court recognized that certain stressors may render 
                                                                                                             
 72. Id.  
 73. Id. at 74. 
 74. See L.K., 631 So. 2d at 608.  
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. See generally Penny v. State, 702 So. 2d 1173 (La. Ct. App. 1997). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 1174. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 1175. 
 82. Id. at 1174 (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 126 (Pocket Ed. 1996)). 
This definition is troublesome because of the emphasis placed on consent existing 
“especially” when given voluntarily, implying consent can exist in narrow 
circumstances when it is not given voluntarily. Id.  
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 




consent legally void,85 the stresses attendant to incarceration did not rise 
to a level that would render the plaintiff, an adult with normal mental 
capacity, incapable of consenting to sexual relations.86  
Louisiana’s appellate courts provide little explanation as to what valid 
consent looks like.87 Although the cases acknowledge that certain 
attendant circumstances can vitiate consent, jurisprudence does not 
account for what the necessary circumstances are aside from tender age 
and mental disability.88 Furthermore, no indication exists as to how to 
determine consent—whether through words, actions, or inferences.89 
Finally, the courts provide no guidance as to whether and when one may 
withdraw consent.90  
Jury instructions on third-degree rape provide no better understanding 
of the standard for consent in deciding purely nonconsensual sexual 
assault cases under Louisiana Revised Statutes § 14:43.91 The instructions 
define third-degree rape as “the act of anal, oral, or vaginal sexual 
intercourse with a victim without the victim’s lawful consent.”92 Thus, the 
instructions provide that emission is not necessary, and any sexual 
penetration, “when the rape involves vaginal or anal sexual intercourse, 
however slight, is sufficient to complete the crime.”93 The instructions 
close with what is needed to convict the defendant of third-degree rape, 
requiring that the defendant had intercourse with the victim, “[t]hat the 
victim did not consent to the sexual intercourse,” and that the defendant 
knew or should have known that the victim did not consent to the act of 
sexual intercourse.94 Such instructions do not clarify how the defendant 
should know the victim did not consent to the act of sexual intercourse—
only that he should.95 
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Reading the jury instructions in pari materia96 with Louisiana Revised 
Statutes § 14:43, one can infer that consent is not present under the 
circumstances listed in the statute: 
(a) when the victim is incapable of resisting or of understanding 
the nature of the act by reason of a stupor or abnormal condition 
of mind produced by an intoxicating agent or any cause and the 
offender knew or should have known of the incapacity; (b) when 
the victim, through unsoundness of mind, is temporarily or 
permanently incapable of understanding the nature of the act and 
the offender knew or should have known of the victim’s 
incapacity; and (c) when the victim submits under the belief that 
the person committing the act is someone known to the victim, 
other than the offender, and such belief is intentionally induced by 
the offender.97  
Although this language provides specific examples of what consent is 
not, it does not provide further clarification of what consent is.98 Legislative 
history can be helpful for statutory interpretation, but it does not always 
solve the problem.99 Louisiana Civil Code article 10 acknowledges that 
“[w]hen the language of the law is susceptible of different meanings, it must 
be interpreted as having the meaning that best conforms to the purpose of 
the law.”100 If the text does not reflect the purpose of the law, interpreters 
may attempt to discover the particular problem the legislature intended to 
address.101  
On May 20, 2015, Senate Bill 117 passed through the House 
Committee on Administration of Criminal Justice.102 The bill proposed 
multiple revisions to Louisiana Revised Statutes § 14:43, including the 
adoption of the “consent clause.”103 Although the “consent clause” passed 
the muster of the legislators present for the hearing, it seems to have almost 
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gone unnoticed.104 A presenter of Senate Bill 117 mentioned the inclusion 
of the “consent clause” in the Bill for a brief moment and moved on to a 
discussion of sexual battery; no questions were asked, and no discussion 
followed.105 The only indication of the purpose behind the “consent 
clause” was Representative Barbara Norton’s generalized statement, in 
which she stated that she believed Senate Bill 117 to be “a great bill,” and 
that there is “more to be done” in the legislative arena of sexual assault 
reform.106 Representative Norton told the Committee, “At the end of the 
day, I just believe that bringing forth as many opportunities that we get as 
legislators . . . to put laws on the books of this magnitude, I think that it 
can [not] only help women but . . . men as well.” Although Representative 
Norton’s statement encouraged the advancement of rape law reform 
generally, it failed to provide meaningful context regarding the specific 
purpose of the “consent clause.”107 
B. The Picture of Consent in a Louisiana Courtroom 
When issues of nonconsensual sex go before a factfinder in a 
Louisiana courtroom, the court must define consent in some fashion to 
guide the verdict—but the simple fact is that courts do not define 
consent.108 Instead of adhering to a clear standard of consent, the courts 
typically tell juries in closing arguments to determine whether consent 
exists by using a “totality of the circumstances” approach and decide if the 
conditions surrounding the sexual encounter lead to the reasonable 
conclusion that the encounter was consensual.109 Essentially, the courts tell 
the jurors to “just figure it out,”110 which requires the jury to formulate a 
standard to analyze the particular facts and then attempt to apply those 
facts based on a personal and subjective understanding of its quickly 
framed standard.111 There is, however, another problem with this setup: 
“rape culture” and its impact on juror decision-making creates profoundly 
unreasonable biases.112  
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Rape culture negatively impacts juror decision-making in sexual 
assault trials not only by increasing the likelihood that jurors will endorse 
erroneous beliefs about rape,113 but also by unconsciously influencing the 
types of evidence jurors attend to and the extent to which they blame the 
parties involved.114 Rape culture leads individuals to endorse rape 
myths,115 sexually objectify women, and perceive sexual violence against 
women as normative.116 Evidence suggests that rape culture increases the 
likelihood that potential jurors will be indoctrinated to endorse the cultural 
narrative narrowly defining rape as forcible sexual assaults that strangers 
perpetrate and women resist.117 
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excused in the media and popular culture. Rape Culture, MARSHALL U., 
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use of misogynistic language, the objectification of women’s bodies, and the 
glamorization of sexual violence, thereby creating a society that disregards 
women’s rights and safety. Id. Examples of rape culture include: blaming the 
victim; trivializing sexual assault by saying, “Boys will be boys”; using sexually 
explicit jokes; inflating false rape report statistics; publicly scrutinizing a victim’s 
dress, mental state, motives, and history; showing gratuitous gendered violence in 
movies and television; defining “manhood” as dominant and sexually aggressive; 
defining “womanhood” as submissive and sexually passive; pressuring men to 
“score”; pressuring women to not appear “cold”; assuming only promiscuous 
women get raped; assuming that men do not get raped or that only “weak” men 
get raped; refusing to take rape accusations seriously; and teaching women to 
avoid getting raped instead of teaching men not to rape. Id. If rape is the violation 
of another person’s autonomy—the use of another person’s body against their 
wishes—then it should not matter what the victim was wearing, if she was 
drinking, how much sexual experience she has had before, or whether she fought 
hard enough to get bruises on her knuckles and skin under her fingernails. KATE 
HARDING, ASKING FOR IT: THE ALARMING RISE OF RAPE CULTURE–AND WHAT 
WE CAN DO ABOUT IT, 12 (Da Capo Press 2015). What matters is that the attacker 
deliberately ignored another person’s basic human right to determine what she 
does with her own body. Id.  
 114. Hildebrand & Najdowski, supra note 17, at 1061. 
 115. Rape myths include, among others, beliefs that women incite men to rape, 
that men cannot be raped, that a rapist can be determined by the way he looks, and 
that women often make false reports of rape. List of Rape Myths, U. MINN. DULUTH, 
http://www.d.umn.edu/cla/faculty/jhamlin/3925/myths.html [https://perma.cc/5K 
FT-JFN8] (last visited July 20, 2018). 
 116. Hildebrand & Najdowski, supra note 17, at 1071. 
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Perhaps the bigger problem with allowing factfinders to construct their 
own standard regarding consent, however, is that hardly anyone agrees on 
what “consent” means.118 As one scholar explained, “The current state of 
confusion [about consent] is evident in the numerous competing views 
about what constitutes mental agreement . . . and what comprises 
performative consent.”119 One view is that sexual consent is present when 
parties are mentally willing to engage in sexual activity, although there are 
ranging interpretations as to what constitutes a consensual mental state, 
from “enthusiastic to grudging, from hedonistic to instrumental, from 
sober to quite inebriated.”120 Another view focuses on the external 
indicators of consent, such as what parties say and do; even under this 
view, there remains considerable variation on what constitutes 
performative consent.121 Yet another view provides that engaging in sexual 
activity without protest equals consent, while others favor affirmative 
expression.122 To complicate matters further, what constitutes affirmatively 
expressed consent differs depending on whom is asked, ranging from 
nonverbal foreplay to “an enthusiastic yes.”123 Criminal codes do little to 
simplify matters.124 Accordingly, “[i]t is no wonder that people come to 
wholly different conclusions about how consent and affirmative consent 
standards actually impact legal decisions and human behavior.”125  
Because of this “consent confusion” juries typically resolve these 
issues by looking at the victim’s external manifestations in circumstantial 
context, that is, what she did, what she said, and how she behaved.126 
Nonetheless, the method of looking to the victim’s external manifestations 
is imprecise since decisionmakers harbor such a wide spectrum of views 
as to what constitutes internal willingness, how that willingness is or 
should be externally manifested, and how a person should interpret those 
external manifestations.127 Inconsistency in such interpretations results 
from a lack of information and misguided beliefs.128 
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Particularly in Louisiana, a widespread concern exists that allegations 
of third-degree rape typically arise after a night of intoxication.129 
Erroneous support for the idea that false rape claims are a common 
problem fuels the belief that women claim rape after regretting a night of 
consensual sex.130 A review of the National Sexual Violence Resource 
Center’s findings found the prevalence of false reporting to be between 
2%–10%.131 The report concluded, however, that rates of false reporting 
are frequently inflated, in part because of inconsistent definitions and 
protocols, or a weak understanding of sexual assault.132 Misconceptions 
about false reporting rates have direct, negative consequences and 
contribute to why many victims do not report sexual assaults.133 To 
improve reporting and response, the justice system needs a thorough 
understanding of sexual violence and consistency in its definitions, 
policies, and procedures.134  
According to a Louisiana prosecutor, the concern about false reports 
of rape is misguided.135 Rather than fabricating rapes, victims are more 
likely to avoid reporting assaults—in part because of the low conviction 
rates obtained in sexual assault cases.136 Consider the following all-too-
common situations: (1) the victim is so scared that she says nothing; (2) 
the victim is forced to express consent;137 or (3) the victim says “yes” to 
sexual conduct with one person, and it is assumed she has consented to 
sexual conduct with others.138 Because a defense in these cases is based 
purely on consent and does not require DNA or physical evidence, these 
are the “absolute hardest” to convict.139 As one scholar reiterates, the 
                                                                                                             
 129. Interview with Angel Monistere, supra note 14. 
 130. False Reporting Overview, NAT’L SEXUAL VIOLENCE RESOURCE CTR., 
https://www.nsvrc.org/sites/default/files/Publications_NSVRC_Overview_False-Re 
porting.pdf [https://perma.cc/KXM4-RAFT] (last visited July 20, 2018).  
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reality for many victims is the little chance of obtaining a prosecution and 
conviction for a rape allegation when the victim knows the defendant or 
when alcohol is involved without extrinsic physical injuries.140 Juries’ 
ideas of what a rapist should look like further complicate obtaining 
convictions—the idea being a stranger who inflicts clear physical injuries 
and leaves DNA evidence.141 The whole trial becomes about convincing 
the jury that this idea is not reality and that a rapist is someone who simply 
does not stop.142 Most of the cases within the gray area of purely 
nonconsensual sexual assault143 therefore result in plea agreements and 
never go to trial.144  
III. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF AN INDETERMINATE UNDERSTANDING OF 
CONSENT 
Because of the confusion about the meaning of consent and the 
inequitable results that follow, the prevalence and social impact of sexual 
assault on a national and local scale requires lawmakers to take a closer 
look at sexual assault and create a better solution.145  
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A. A Broad Context of Sexual Assault 
Every 98 seconds, someone in the United States is sexually 
assaulted.146 One in four girls and one in six boys will be sexually 
victimized before their eighteenth birthday.147 Further, approximately two-
thirds of sexual assaults are committed by someone the victim knows.148 
Up to 40% of victims become infected with a sexually transmitted disease, 
and four out of five victims report suffering from chronic physical or 
psychological conditions.149 Sexual assault also creates an economic 
burden on the surrounding environment;150 every rape costs the United 
States an average of $151,423.151 According to The American Institute on 
Domestic Violence, victims lose nearly 8 million days of paid work each 
year, equaling more than 32,000 full-time jobs.152 
Perhaps the most striking statistics regarding sexual assault are those 
concerning the justice system’s response to sexual assault offenses.153 
According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ National Crime 
Victimization Survey, police responded to only 84% of reported sexual 
assaults from 2005 to 2010,154 and only a quarter of the sexual assault 
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victimizations from the survey sample generated a police report.155 
Judicial response does not differ significantly.156 Out of every 100 rapes, 
10 lead to an arrest, and 3 perpetrators spend a day in prison.157 Ultimately, 
97 perpetrators “walk away free.”158  
In Louisiana, victims reported 1,244 rapes to law enforcement in 2013 
using a more traditional definition of rape, whereas other victims reported 
1,619 rapes using the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s new definition of 
rape159 that acknowledges gender does not limit who can be a victim or 
offender and offers protection for those who cannot give consent because 
of temporary or permanent incapacity.160 Despite over 1,000 rape reports, 
police made only 263 arrests,161 of which 65 of the defendants were 
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younger than 18, evidencing that the problem of sexual assault has not 
escaped Louisiana’s backyard.162  
B. A Narrow Illustration of a Broader Problem: The University Campus 
A notable example of the significance of sexual assault is its explosion 
on college campuses nationally and locally.163 Seven percent of college 
men admitted to committing rape or attempted rape, and 63% of these men 
admitted to committing multiple offenses, averaging six rapes each.164 The 
prevalence of sexual assault on campuses across the nation has been a 
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problem most universities have turned a blind eye to—at least until 
recently.165 A United States Senate Subcommittee Report determined that 
despite the prevalence of campus sexual assaults, about 41% of colleges 
and universities reported that the universities did not investigate a single 
sexual assault in the previous five years.166 More than 20% of the nation’s 
largest private universities conducted fewer investigations than the 
number of incidents they reported to the Department of Education, with 
some institutions reporting as many as seven times more incidents of 
sexual violence than they have investigated.167  
In response to the U.S. Senate investigation that found several colleges 
and universities nationwide in violation of federal law by failing to 
investigate sexual assault on campus, in July 2014, Louisiana State 
Senator J.P. Morrell requested information from the Louisiana Board of 
Regents168 regarding sexual violence on Louisiana’s public college 
campuses.169 The report contained data from the four state collegiate 
systems: the Louisiana State University System, the Southern University 
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System, the University of Louisiana System, and the Louisiana 
Community and Technical College System.170 
The report first noted that Louisiana does not currently have a uniform 
policy governing the issue of sexual assault on campuses.171 The lack of a 
uniform policy can be partly attributed to the Board of Regents’ lack of 
constitutional or statutory authority to adopt statewide policies concerning 
sexual assault.172 The Board’s lack of authority exists because campus 
sexual assault is a student affairs issue, traditionally within the purview of 
an institution’s management board, such as a board of supervisors, which 
has jurisdiction over the day-to-day operation and management of its 
member institutions.173 Consequently, there are currently no state laws or 
statewide policies on the matter.174 Regardless, the Board stated that it is 
ready and willing to launch a statewide effort in collaboration with the four 
systems and other stakeholders to combat the problem of campus sexual 
assault.175  
The results of the Board’s report seem misleadingly optimistic at first 
glance.176 Overall, Louisiana’s public colleges and universities have low 
rates of reported sexual assaults compared to national statistics of reported 
college sexual assaults,177 which indicate that one in four college students 
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encounter a rape or attempted rape.178 Although the lack of reported 
incidents may look positive initially, the Board noted that victims only 
report 5% of rapes and attempted rapes on college campuses.179 Reasons 
for this discrepancy may include victim confidentiality, the victim’s 
hesitation to participate in the adjudication process, the relationship 
between the victim and perpetrator, a lack of education resources for 
victims, or a culture of “victim-blaming” on campuses and surrounding 
communities.180 Universities’ failure to encourage reporting of sexual 
violence can also contribute to the failure to report sexual assault on 
college campuses.181 Only 51% of institutions in the national sample 
provided a hotline to survivors, and only 44% of institutions in the national 
sample provided the option to report sexual assaults only, instead of sexual 
assault with another offense.182 Approximately 81% of institutions did not 
allow confidential reporting.183 
If the Board’s finding that national statistics place the national average 
of reported rapes and reported attempted rapes at 5%,184 simple 
mathematics reveals that 105 reported sexual assaults is 5% of 2,100; 
therefore, although victims reported 105 sexual assaults or attempted 
sexual assaults from 2009 to 2013, approximately 1,995 others went 
unreported.185 After analyzing multiple surveys,186 Professor Mary Graw 
Leary concluded that despite disputes as to the exact number of sexual 
assault victims, the reality is that when it comes to rape, the most 
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“pervasive danger” is different from what once was feared and the problem 
is more widespread than ever perceived.187 
The Board’s report did find that authorities investigated most cases 
reported on Louisiana’s campuses, indicating that Louisiana’s campuses 
were responsive to reports of sexual assault.188 In addition, the 
investigative policies of individual campuses and the number of 
investigations are explained in depth throughout the report.189 Lacking 
from the report is any mention of disciplinary action or sanctions in 
response to the investigations.190 The Board concluded that although 
Louisiana’s campuses are striving to form an effective but fair response to 
the issue of sexual assault, “significant additional measures are necessary 
to ensure that college campuses are safe spaces for students.”191 The 
findings suggest that although most campuses reported investigative 
strategies to respond to sexual assaults, fewer preventative measures to 
address sexual assault appear to be in place.192 Although Louisiana may 
be investigating sexual assault reports on the back-end,193 the focus needs 
to shift to prevention by establishing a clear definition of “consent” so that 
people are aware of the behaviors that violate the offense before they 
commit the offense inadvertently.  
IV. THE LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION OF AFFIRMATIVE CONSENT 
Because legislation is the principal source of law in Louisiana’s civil 
law jurisdiction, adopting a legislative solution to cure the ambiguity of 
Louisiana Revised Statutes § 14:43’s third-degree rape “consent clause” 
is a rational and functional approach to curing the statutory deficiency.194 
Adopting an affirmative consent standard will not end sexual assault, but 
it will act as a positive movement in the effort to reduce the offense.195  
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A. Establishing a Clear Definition of Affirmative Consent 
Affirmative consent provides that silence—often arising out of 
incapacitation, fear, or unconsciousness—does not constitute consent to 
sexual conduct.196 Instead, it requires an affirmative and voluntary agreement 
to engage in sexual activity from a fully capacitated and conscious person.197 
As is common with criminal law conversations, the debate surrounding 
affirmative consent is typically obfuscated by other agendas that cloud the 
discussion of the complex and legal issues involved.198 Therefore, a clear 
definition is a “threshold requirement” to a fruitful discourse.199 
Much of the progress in the affirmative consent movement is happening 
at the collegiate level, with California and New York leading the 
movement.200 In October 2015, the California Legislature passed a new law 
requiring the governing bodies of each of the state’s highest educational 
institutions to adopt certain policies regarding sexual assault, including an 
affirmative consent standard.201 The legislation defines affirmative consent 
as an “affirmative, conscious, and voluntary agreement to engage in sexual 
activity,” and further states that each person is responsible for ensuring that 
he or she has affirmative consent to engage in sexual conduct.202 Lack of 
protest, lack of resistance, or silence do not constitute consent; the consent 
must be ongoing throughout the sexual encounter.203 One may revoke the 
consent at any time, and a dating relationship or past sexual relationship 
cannot “by itself be assumed to be an indicator of consent.”204  
Similarly, New York passed legislation in October 2015 requiring 
higher education institutions to also adopt an affirmative consent 
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standard.205 New York’s definition of affirmative consent varies slightly 
from California’s in that it requires “a knowing, voluntary, and mutual 
decision among all participants to engage in sexual activity.”206 
Anticipating what consent may look like, the legislation provides that 
consent “can be given by words or actions, as long as those words or 
actions create clear permission regarding willingness to engage in the 
sexual activity.”207 Silence or a lack of resistance do not constitute consent; 
prior consent to a sexual act does not demonstrate consent to another act; 
and one may withdraw consent.208 Furthermore, New York specified that 
consent is not voluntary if it is the product of coercion, intimidation, force, 
or threat.209 Finally, the legislation explicitly states that when one can no 
longer give or withdraw consent, the sexual activity “must stop.”210 
Although California’s and New York’s legislation differ slightly, both 
reach certain touchstones that stem from the April 2014 First Report of the 
White House Task Force to Protect Students From Sexual Assault, which 
included a minimum standard for universities to use in developing their 
own sexual assault policies.211 
Mary Graw Leary drew on both the New York and California statutes, 
many of the approximately 800 affirmative consent standards that 
universities adopted, and the suggested language of the National Sexual 
Violence Resource Center212 to create a comprehensive definition of 
affirmative consent.213 The definition provides that affirmative consent is 
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an affirmative, conscious, and voluntary agreement in words or actions by 
all parties to engage in sexual activity that may be withdrawn at any 
time.214 Silence, lack of protest, or a previous dating or sexual relationship 
do not constitute affirmative consent; moreover, it is not met if the person 
is unconscious, asleep, incapacitated, or otherwise unable to consent.215 
The Louisiana Legislature should adopt this standard in defining sexual 
consent in Louisiana Revised Statutes § 14:43. 
By using Leary’s definition, parties engaged in sexual conduct have a 
clearer understanding of what is required of them, as there is less 
ambiguity about affirmative mutuality, voluntariness, consciousness, and 
an ability to withdraw.216 Leary argues that “affirmative consent culture” 
has a place within the legal system because it satisfies the necessary 
functions of criminal law: notice, clarity, and guidance.217 Leary’s 
standard provides adequate notice as to what constitutes third-degree rape 
by articulating a rule that is clear to the parties at risk of perpetrating or 
being victimized by sexual assault.218 The standard provides clarity to 
those charged with investigating and prosecuting such cases by providing 
a finely-tuned framework.219 Such clarity is relevant in light of the 
National Institute of Justice’s Campus Sexual Assault Study, which found 
that 56% of forced sexual assault victims and 67% of incapacitated sexual 
assault victims did not report the assault because they did not think it was 
serious enough, and 35% did not report the assault because it was unclear 
whether a crime occurred or was intended.220 Leary’s definition also 
provides more guidance as to what constitutes sexual assault,221 which 
may result in fewer sexual assaults, more victims reporting sexual assaults, 
and law enforcement more adequately handling investigations.222 
Ultimately, the definition Leary provided allows victims of sexual assault 
and victims of false allegations of sexual assault a better ability to receive 
the appropriate legal remedy for their harm.223 
Many opponents to sexual assault reform argue that the ambiguities 
present in an acquaintance rape situation merit a requirement of force in 
the definition of sexual assault because of the alleged difficulty in 
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verifying an assault in the absence of force or resistance.224 Despite 
concerns about ambiguities, implementing an affirmative consent standard 
makes clear not only what consent is, but also what kind of consent a 
person must obtain before engaging in sexual conduct.225 From the vantage 
point of the judicial system, having an affirmative consent standard 
prevents a court from speculating about whether consent occurred.226 
Unlike laws that consider passivity as consent, even when the victim could 
not have articulated consent, an affirmative consent standard ensures that 
a potential offender knows what he or she must obtain to continue 
engaging in sexual conduct: an affirmative and voluntary agreement to 
engage in the activity from a conscious person who is not incapacitated.227  
Louisiana Revised Statutes § 14:43 and its legislative history make no 
explicit mention of the state’s preference toward or against affirmative 
consent.228 Regardless, neither the Louisiana Legislature nor the courts 
have adopted an affirmative consent standard.229 Implementing such a 
standard to the ill-defined “consent clause” helps further three goals: (1) 
providing adequate notice as to what constitutes sexual assault to those 
contemplating sexual activity; (2) providing guidance to those charged 
with determining probable cause for culpability of sexual assault; and (3) 
providing justice to victims of sexual assault. 
B. Responding to Criticisms of Affirmative Consent 
Although the affirmative consent movement is increasingly gaining 
public favor, it nevertheless has its critics.230 Because of the trauma to 
victims and defendants alike,231 the debate surrounding affirmative 
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consent and other sexual assault reform remains extremely controversial.232 
The mainstream media’s interjection of useless sound bites, such as “yes 
means yes,”233 “no means no,” and “burden shifting”234 further complicate 
the affirmative consent debate. Critics of the affirmative consent movement 
routinely express three objections the standard: (1) it will not eliminate 
sexual assault; (2) it “criminalizes sex”; and (3) it shifts the burden of proof 
to the criminal defendant.235  
In response to the critique that affirmative consent will not eliminate 
sexual assault, one need look no further than the old maxim: “don’t reject 
the good for the perfect.”236 Although it is true that sexual violence will 
continue as long as humans exist, educating people and progressively 
changing the law to reflect this new understanding may decrease sexual 
assault.237 Society recognizes that many other crimes seem insurmountable, 
such as terrorism, opioid epidemics, and gang violence,238 yet different 
solutions continue to be implemented to combat these significant social 
problems.239 Sexual violence should be treated no differently.240 
The critique that affirmative consent criminalizes sex stems from the 
argument that prosecutors will charge defendants who did not engage in 
nonconsensual sex with rape because they now have the authority.241 In 
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the sexual assault context, little support exists for an over-prosecution 
problem;242 in fact, research points instead to a trend of under-
prosecution.243 Approximately 10–12 states have affirmative consent 
standards in their criminal statutes,244 and an additional 3–4 states interpret 
their statutes to require affirmative consent.245 Although a textual 
commitment to affirmative consent exists, many of the states have diluted 
their standards by requiring “force.”246 Only three states that have “pure” 
affirmative consent standards remain: Wisconsin, Vermont, and New 
Jersey.247 If a problem with over-prosecution exists, it should have appeared 
in these three states.248 Instead, prosecution of cases where the disputed issue 
was solely whether consent existed was “minuscule,” and the majority of 
prosecuted cases always involved circumstances manifesting some element 
of force.249  
Finally, in terms of burden shifting, critics of affirmative consent 
frequently suggest the impossibility of the defendant “proving” affirmative 
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consent.250 Yet, just as with a theft charge where a prosecutor must prove 
that a defendant did not have the consent of the owner to take the property, 
a prosecutor in a sexual assault case still must prove the defendant did not 
have the consent to “take the victim’s sexual autonomy.”251 The burden 
remains the same—the prosecutor must prove every element of the offense 
beyond a reasonable doubt.252 The only difference is the legal significance 
of passivity, which no longer signifies consent and instead reflects the 
now-common belief that a lack of behavior suggesting a desire to engage 
in sexual conduct does not constitute consent.253 Multiple courts have 
rejected this exact burden-shifting argument, upholding affirmative 
consent laws against constitutional challenges.254 
C. The Possibility of Unconstitutionality in the Absence of a “Consent” 
Definition 
Article I, Section 2 of the Louisiana Constitution provides an 
equivalent to the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution, in that “no 
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, except by due process 
of law.”255 An element of due process is the required clarity in a statute 
criminalizing an offense.256 A statute is unconstitutionally vague and 
violates due process if people of ordinary intelligence must guess at its 
meaning and may come to different conclusions.257 A criminal statute must 
not contain a standard so vague that the public is uncertain as to the 
proscribed conduct, and the factfinder is unfettered by any legally fixed 
standards as to what the statute prohibits.258  
Under Louisiana constitutional law, the “void for vagueness” doctrine 
provides that a criminal statute must meet two requirements to satisfy due 
process: (1) adequate notice to individuals that certain contemplated 
conduct is proscribed; and (2) an adequate standard for those charged with 
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determining the guilt or innocence of the accused.259 The Louisiana 
Criminal Code states that the articles of the Code cannot be extended by 
analogy to create crimes not provided for within the Code.260 Still, to 
promote justice and to effect the objects of law, the provisions shall be 
given a genuine construction, according to the fair import of their words, 
taken in their usual sense, in connection with the context, and with 
reference to the purpose of the provision.261  
The ambiguity and vagueness as to the meaning of consent within 
Louisiana Revised Statutes § 14:43 creates constitutional concerns.262 
Louisiana Revised Statute § 14:43 appears to support the proposition for 
unconstitutionality, because it calls for interpretation according to the fair 
meaning of words in light of the purpose of the provision.263 Because no 
general consensus as to the meaning of consent exists,264 one genuine 
construction cannot be given to the term, further clouding the statute’s 
meaning. 
Furthermore, because of the dearth of legislative history for Louisiana 
Revised Statutes § 14:43, the purpose of the “consent clause” can best be 
boiled down to the prevention of nonconsensual sex.265 It follows that 
achieving the prevention of nonconsensual sex requires a clear definition 
of consent. In the absence of a defined standard, the purpose of adding the 
“consent clause” is rendered meaningless. The meaning of consent is not 
clear, so it neither provides notice to a defendant of the prohibited conduct 
nor an adequate standard to determine guilt or innocence.266 Under this 
analysis, the statute is unconstitutionally vague.267  
On the contrary, ambiguity exists as to what consent means rather than 
whether consent must be obtained; the requirement that consent be 
obtained is expressly stated in the statute.268 Perhaps, then, the vagueness 
in the statute does not rise to the level of unconstitutionality, and any 
confusion as to what constitutes consent will be treated as a legal mistake 
of fact.269 Finding Louisiana Revised Statutes § 14:43’s “consent clause” 
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constitutional remains in line with basic principles of statutory 
construction, in that courts are not to consider constitutional challenges 
lightly and “judicial self-restraint” has been deemed appropriate.270 Courts 
must uphold the constitutionality of statutes whenever possible and must 
read a statute so as to avoid finding unconstitutionality.271 Poor drafting of 
laws may create or promote constitutional and statutory interpretation 
issues, which likely occur when a statute omits a definition, explanation, 
or standard for a vague and unambiguous phrase such as Louisiana 
Revised Statutes § 14:43’s “consent clause.”272  
Regardless of whether the “consent clause” rises to a level of 
unconstitutionality, the statute is nevertheless ambiguous and vague. Such 
constitutional concerns further justify the adoption of an affirmative 
consent standard. The affirmative consent standard, in isolation, may not 
be enough to determine whether consent was present every time; the 
question then becomes one of judicial reasonableness within the 
affirmative consent framework.273 
V. JUDICIAL INCORPORATION OF AFFIRMATIVE CONSENT IN LIGHT OF 
“REASONABLENESS” 
Although courts may not sit as a “super legislature” to judge the policy 
or wisdom of legislation, courts do engage in statutory construction and 
interpretation when the text of a law does not provide adequate guidance 
to determine its meaning or intent.274 In fact, the affirmative consent 
movement began as a product of judicial statutory interpretation of an 
ambiguous standard of physical force.275 Although the judiciary has been 
slower to recognize affirmative consent, the evolution is alive and 
recognized, thanks, in great part, to M.T.S.—the milestone case that 
sparked the movement.276  
In May 1990, 15-year-old C.G.277 was living with her mother, siblings, 
and several other people, including 17-year-old M.T.S. and his girlfriend.278 
M.T.S. was temporarily residing at C.G.’s home with the permission of 
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C.G.’s mother.279 The teenagers offered different recollections of how the 
events of May 21 unfolded, and the court did not credit either account 
fully.280 The record reflects, however, that prior to the incident in question, 
M.T.S. and C.G.’s relationship had developed past the point of formality.281 
It is undisputed that around 1:30 a.m. on the morning of the incident, 
M.T.S. appeared at the door of C.G.’s bedroom, and C.G., who was 
dressed in shorts, underpants, a shirt, and a bra, got up to go to the 
bathroom, passing in front of M.T.S.282 C.G. claimed to have returned 
from the bathroom and fallen into a “heavy” sleep, only to be awoken to 
M.T.S. on top of her engaged in sexual intercourse.283 C.G. testified that 
she immediately slapped M.T.S. on the face and told him to stop and leave, 
after which he complied.284 M.T.S., on the other hand, testified that when 
C.G. returned from the bathroom, she and he consensually took off each 
other’s clothing, got into bed, and began “petting.”285 He testified that on 
about the fourth penetrative thrust, C.G. pushed him off and told him to 
stop, after which he complied.286 The next morning, C.G. told her mother 
that M.T.S. had raped her, and her mother filed a complaint with the 
police.287 
The New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice defined “sexual assault” as 
the commission “of sexual penetration” with the use of “physical force or 
coercion.”288 Finding ambiguity in the statutory language, the court 
explained, “[A]s evidenced by the disagreements among the lower courts 
and the parties, and the variety of possible usages, the statutory words 
‘physical force’ do not evoke a single meaning that is plain and 
obvious.”289 Hence, the court’s task became interpreting the words 
“physical force.”290 In taking on this feat, the court recognized perhaps one 
of the most polarizing dichotomies of the decision: “We also remain 
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mindful of the basic tenet of statutory construction that penal statutes are 
to be strictly construed in favor of the accused. Nevertheless, the 
construction must conform to the intent of the Legislature.”291 
M.T.S. produced two results based on the possibility that proving the 
crime would turn on the victim’s state of mind or conduct, thereby putting 
the victim on trial instead of the criminal defendant.292 The two 
conclusions may appear separate and distinct at first; however, they are 
interconnected and dependent on the existence of one another.293 
The first conclusion is the intrinsic force standard.294 The intrinsic 
force standard, which the court used to find physical force, states that 
“physical force in excess of that inherent in the act of sexual penetration 
is not required for such penetration to be unlawful.”295 “Physical force” is 
to be viewed in light of a reasonableness principle; the statutory definition 
is met if the defendant “applies any amount of force against another person 
in the absence of what a reasonable person would believe to be affirmative 
and freely-given permission to the act of sexual penetration.”296  
The requirement of affirmative and freely given permission in relation 
to physical force naturally led to the second conclusion of M.T.S. and the 
beginning of the affirmative consent movement.297 The court ruled that 
“any act of sexual penetration engaged in by the defendant without 
affirmative and freely-given permission of the victim to the specific act of 
penetration constitutes the offense of sexual assault.”298 The court noted 
that permission may be verbal or nonverbal.299 
Where ambiguity remains without clearly expressed consent, M.T.S. 
imputes a reasonableness principle that allows an inference from “acts or 
statements reasonably viewed in light of the surrounding circumstances” 
when a reasonable person would have believed that the alleged victim had 
affirmatively and freely consented.300 The role of the factfinder is not to 
determine whether engaging in any act of penetration without the 
permission of another person is reasonable—as the court found the 
legislature already determined by enacting the sexual assault statute—but 
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to determine whether the defendant’s belief that the alleged victim had 
freely given affirmative permission was reasonable.301 
Inevitably, ambiguous situations will arise in which one party claims 
consent was present, the other party claims consent was not present, and 
there is a lack of evidence to corroborate the conflicting testimony. To 
resolve this ambiguity, the reasonableness principle proscribed in M.T.S. 
acts as a lens through which to view the surrounding circumstances and 
determine whether a reasonable person, that is, the defendant, would have 
reasonably believed that the alleged victim had affirmatively and freely 
consented.302 Thus, the factfinder’s job is not to determine whether 
nonconsensual sex is reasonable, or whether the alleged victim’s conduct 
was reasonable. The factfinder’s job is to determine whether the 
surrounding circumstances led the defendant to reasonably believe the 
alleged victim consented.303 
Because the standard of reasonableness articulated in M.T.S. looks 
similar to the “totality of the circumstances” approach already in use 
throughout Louisiana,304 it is tempting to question what it adds to the 
analysis. The response to this concern is straightforward—one may only 
view the reasonableness principle in light of affirmative consent. In other 
words, reasonableness must still fit within the framework of affirmative 
consent. For example, it would be unreasonable to determine that consent 
to sexual conduct given to one person automatically extended to multiple 
people because consent may not be inferred solely from a past or different 
relationship.305  
To be effective, affirmative consent cannot exist in a vacuum.306 
Instead, the standard must exist as part of a “larger multidisciplinary 
constellation of measures to address sexual assault.”307 Incorporating a 
jurisprudential principle of reasonableness as seen in M.T.S., which seems 
familiar to Louisiana jurisprudence, ensures the vitality of affirmative 
consent in Louisiana, because an affirmative consent standard alone 
cannot erase all ambiguity from a private encounter.308 Integrating the 
M.T.S. reasonableness principle into the previously defined affirmative 
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consent standard will increasingly adapt the standard to real-world 
circumstances, as integrate with Louisiana’s current “totality of the 
circumstances” approach.309 M.T.S. may be questionable as a matter of 
statutory construction because the disputed statute required proof of “force 
or coercion,” and “lack of consent” was not an express element; thus, the 
practical effect of the decision is to write “force or coercion” out of the 
statute and to replace it with an affirmative consent requirement.310 
Nevertheless, the interpretation of the New Jersey statute is consistent with 
the underlying principle that the core purpose of modern rape law is to 
protect the sexual autonomy of the female.311  
CONCLUSION 
The prevalence of sexual assault is a problem that society can no 
longer ignore, especially in light of mounting scandals centering around 
mainstream figures like Harvey Weinstein, Roman Polanski, Bill Cosby, 
and countless others.312 Louisiana Revised Statutes § 14:43’s “consent 
clause” does not adequately satisfy the criminal justice system’s 
responsibility to prevent sexual assault and creates an environment in 
which neither defendant nor victim can escape unscathed.313 People 
interested in engaging in sexual conduct cannot clearly identify when their 
behavior will rise to the criminal charge of rape. Law enforcement cannot 
rely on a consistent standard that will determine when rape occurs.314 Thus, 
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victims of rape and victims of false allegations of rape slip through the 
cracks and do not receive justice. Adopting the affirmative consent 
standard in conjunction with the reasonableness principle articulated in 
M.T.S. redresses these deficits by providing clear standards of accepted 
conduct and prohibited conduct.315 Although no legal definition can 
eliminate ambiguity in every real-life situation, affirmative consent goes 
beyond the norm by requiring the clear communication of willingness to 
engage, which better recognizes the reality and nature of sexual assault.316  
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